At seventeen, I concluded that I would soon be able to vote, but I didn't really know how the reality I was supposed to influence should be organized. I didn't want to choose people and slogans without understanding the systems behind politics. So I started with definitions, encyclopedias, and comparing systems. The internet was just developing in Poland at the time, and I didn't come from a family that would have provided me with early access to a vast library of knowledge. I had to piece together a picture from what was available.

This search led me to Switzerland. Citizen autonomy was paramount: the ability to influence law not only by electing a representative every few years, but also through initiatives and referendums. Later, theory met practice, as I moved to Switzerland. Only then did I see that the system isn't a textbook abstraction. It's visible in government offices, car registration, starting a small business, and in the way institutions treat people.

I don't believe that copying three Swiss solutions and pasting them into Poland is enough. The state system is too complex to be saved by a single principle. Subsidiarity without accountability can relegate a faulty mechanism to a lower level rather than repair it. A referendum without individual rights and minority protection can become a tool for a fleeting majority. A free market without rules can end in private feudalism. The elements must function complementarily.

Civilization is not a state system

In my thinking, I draw on a distinction inspired by Feliks Koneczny's concept of civilization. For me, civilization is a layer of overarching principles and a way of organizing collective life. A state system, on the other hand, is a specific structure of institutions, competencies, and procedures. These are not interchangeable concepts.

Poland and Switzerland can stem from the same Latin civilization, yet create completely different living conditions for citizens. This is precisely what is important to me: one civilization does not have to produce a single model of state. Different systems can compete with each other, test different solutions, and citizens can also compare them by "voting with their feet"—choosing where they want to live.

The question, then, isn't how to name a single ideal structure. It's: what state system best translates specific values ​​into everyday relationships between individuals, communities, municipalities, regions, and the federation?

I don't have a single, magical answer. Rather, I see layers that must sustain each other: individual dignity, freedom combined with responsibility, family and communities, the rule of law, property, entrepreneurship, local autonomy, self-correction mechanisms, security, and a culture of trust. Switzerland doesn't implement these perfectly, but in many places it comes closer to my working model than Poland.

Decisions should be as close to the consequences as possible

Switzerland divides power between the Confederation, 26 cantons, and over two thousand municipalities. The cantons have their own constitutions, parliaments, governments, and courts, and powers not granted to the federation generally remain with them (FDFA, "Federalism"). Official examples of this division show, among other things, federal responsibility for defense and foreign policy, cantonal responsibility for police and education, and municipal responsibility for some local infrastructure.

This doesn't mean that every decision should automatically fall to the municipality. I don't want to arbitrarily decide at which level each competence should be placed—such an action would defeat the entire purpose. The division should arise historically, voluntarily, and from the bottom up, through negotiations between people living in a given area. It should also be able to change when experience shows that the previous solution is ineffective.

Security is a good example. The army is a tool of the Confederation, while public order is primarily the responsibility of the cantonal, city, and municipal police forces; the federal FedPol coordinates cooperation and handles matters falling under federal jurisdiction (fedpol, "Police cooperation"). This is not a pure "joint army, cantonal police" model, but a multi-level division of responsibilities.

I see a similar logic in education. A uniform curriculum for the entire country might ensure a common minimum, but people by the sea and in the mountains live in different environments, face different conditions, and may require somewhat different practical knowledge. I don't claim to know the ideal curriculum division. I believe residents should be able to develop it and compare the results of various solutions, rather than receiving every detail from a single center.

Poland is not devoid of local government. The Constitution simultaneously defines it as a unitary state and mandates the decentralization of public authority; local government performs a significant portion of its duties in its own name and under its own responsibility (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 3, 15–16, and 163–170). The difference, then, is not that Switzerland has local government while Poland lacks it. It concerns the depth of autonomy, the constitutional position of the regions, and the way citizens can correct decisions at a higher level.

Democracy as a Permanent Possibility of Correction

When I was younger, I called Switzerland the only democracy, and the rest of the representative systems—a caricature of democracy. Today, this needs to be stated more precisely. Switzerland also has a parliament and a seven-member Federal Council elected by parliament. It is a federal representative democracy combined with exceptionally extensive direct instruments (FDFA, "Political system").

At the federal level, 100,000 citizens can submit an initiative to amend the constitution within 18 months. An optional referendum on an act of parliament requires 50,000 signatures within 100 days. Constitutional amendments are submitted to a mandatory referendum and require a majority of voters and cantons (FDFA, "Political system"). Citizens are therefore not merely recipients of their representatives' promises. They have regular tools to introduce, halt, and evaluate laws.

In Poland, a national referendum is called by the Sejm or the President with the consent of the Senate, and its result is generally binding with the participation of more than half of those eligible (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 125). This is not a permanent, bottom-up mechanism for vetoing laws comparable to the Swiss optional referendum.

The most important thing for me is the possibility of correction. People can be swayed by external narratives, adopt a fashionable solution, or make a simple mistake. A referendum does not guarantee wisdom. However, it allows for the consequences to be seen over time and the matter to be reopened without a revolution. The system has the right to make mistakes, but it should have a procedure for peacefully reversing errors.

Trust is visible at the counter

The theory of federalism doesn't yet dictate how a citizen will be treated on Monday morning. For me, everyday experiences were important. In my twenties, I helped others communicate in English in Swiss offices, even though the country operates in a multilingual environment. Switzerland has four national languages: German, French, Italian, and Romansh. At the federal level, the main official languages ​​are the first three, and Romansh is used for official contacts with Romansh-speaking people (FDFA, "Multilingualism").

I remember officials who helped people make the right decision, instead of sending someone with one piece of paper to the next counter. I don't present this as a representative study. This is my experience of a system where the office acted more like a service to citizens than a labyrinth meant to test its durability.

Inspections for cars used at work were similar. The institution would send the appointment. If it didn't work for me, I could change it by phone, email, or in person. Missing out had a small, clear financial consequence, because someone had booked the time. When a defect was discovered, there was a simple path to re-inspection. The obligation remained an obligation, but the system organized it so it could be completed.

When registering my car, the official issued me with plates before paying the fee and said he trusted me. I returned with confirmation, even though he didn't ask for it. This small moment demonstrates the power of feedback: demonstrated trust can trigger accountability, and accountability allows the system to reduce the cost of inspections. Not every official relationship can operate this way, but it's worth noting how an institution shapes individual behavior rather than simply assuming guilt.

Entry barrier, taxes, and room for experimentation

I also felt the difference when trying to run a small online store. In Switzerland, sole proprietorship is established upon the commencement of an independent, sustainable business and requires no minimum capital. Registration in the commercial register becomes mandatory for businesses operating in a commercial capacity and with an annual turnover exceeding 100,000 Swiss francs; Obligations still remain, including those related to the recognition of self-employment, taxes, and work permits (Swiss SME Portal, "Legal form: Sole Proprietorships"; "Self-Employment: Guidelines").

So, this wasn't a "business without a business" in the sense of a lack of rules. It was an opportunity to start a small business without being treated like a fully-fledged company from day one. I was supposed to collect data and react once thresholds were crossed. The system left room for experimentation before the venture reached a scale that justified the full burden of formalities.

In Poland, I later attempted to launch an online art gallery. Payment integration and requirements regarding the origin of works, contracts, and anti-money laundering prevented the project from coming to fruition. I can't draw conclusions about Polish entrepreneurship as a whole from a single case. It's also important to separate state law from the requirements of a private payment processor. However, I can honestly say that as a small business, I experienced two completely different entry thresholds.

The entry threshold isn't just about registers and forms. It's also about taxes, contributions, liability, access to payments, and the number of obligations that must be met before the idea can be tested. Each of these elements changes the cost of the experiment. A system can allow someone to create value first and only add obligations as scale increases, or it can treat a small sample as a mature enterprise from the outset.

The standard VAT rate is currently 8.1% in Switzerland and 23% in Poland (Swiss Federal Tax Administration, "Swiss VAT rates"; Ministry of Finance, "VAT Tax Rates"). In a simplified example, a phone with a net price of 1,000 units would cost 1,081 units at the Swiss rate and 1,230 units at the Polish rate. The difference is 149 units. This example deliberately isolates the VAT itself: it ignores the exchange rate, customs duties, margins, distribution costs, reduced rates, and price differences between markets.

That's why I compare price with income, not just tax with tax. The OECD's comparable series for 2024, which adjusts for price differences using purchasing power parity, shows that the average annual wage in Switzerland was more than twice that in Poland (OECD, "Average annual wages"). In the model example, the Polish buyer not only pays a higher gross price due to VAT, but the expense also consumes a larger portion of their salary. OECD data describe the average gross salary, not the disposable income of a specific person, therefore they show the mechanism and direction of the difference, not the account of each household.

This doesn't mean that a single rate determines the quality of a country. It does mean, however, that fiscal design has material consequences for the purchase price, the capital retained by the customer and the entrepreneur, and the profitability of a small experiment. A full comparison would require taking into account income taxes, contributions, thresholds, reliefs, labor costs, and the competencies of individual levels of government. This is a separate topic. In this article, VAT is one clear example of the entire system in action, not its final assessment.

Experience is not the only point of reference

My examples are personal, but the differences between countries are not visible solely in my memories. A helpful, though imperfect, point of reference is the Human Development Index. The HDI is not composed of GDP, as is sometimes simplified, but of life expectancy, education, and gross national income per capita. It therefore combines health, the ability to acquire knowledge, and material living conditions (UNDP, "Human Development Index").

In the Human Development Report 2025, based on 2023 data, Switzerland achieved an HDI of 0.970, ranking third, while Poland achieved an HDI of 0.906, ranking 35th. Gross national income per capita, calculated at purchasing power parity in 2021 international dollars, was 81,949 and 42,218, respectively (UNDP, "Human Development Report 2025", tables 1-2).

This is not mathematical proof that Switzerland's result was caused by referendums, federalism, or lower VAT. The HDI also does not measure the overall quality of a state: it does not directly describe political freedom, security, inequality, quality of administration, or citizen accountability. However, it shows that my experience is not inconsistent with broader social and economic outcomes. Anecdotal evidence suggests a mechanism; a comparable indicator verifies whether the direction of observation also exists beyond it.

The Price of Autonomy

The Swiss model is not a machine for producing good decisions. Direct democracy can be slow. Campaigning and collecting signatures require resources that are unequally distributed among groups. Federalism can lead to differences in services and opportunities between cantons. Official Swiss materials themselves point out some of these limitations (FDFA, "Swiss Democracy Passport").

However, I do not consider the lack of federal voting rights for foreigners to be a drawback. At the federal level, Swiss citizens over 18 years of age can vote. At the same time, some cantons and municipalities grant foreigners the right to vote at the cantonal or local level, so it's not true that a citizen without citizenship cannot participate in decisions anywhere (Swiss government portal, "The right to vote in Switzerland"). For me, co-decision-making for the entire state should be linked to joining its political community, not automatically resulting from residence alone.

Currently, ordinary naturalization generally requires ten years of residence, a C permit, and meeting integration requirements; there are also cantonal and municipal requirements (State Secretariat for Migration, "Ordinary naturalization"). I would consider a longer safety net: for example, 25 years or a period corresponding to 1/3–1/2 of the average life expectancy in a given area. I do not present this as a proven optimal solution or a description of current law. It is a proposal based on the assumption that integration takes time and that a community should be able to distinguish between the permanent assumption of responsibility and the mere use of its institutions.

Time alone doesn't measure integration either. Someone might know the language, rules, and community better after ten years than another person after twenty-five. A long period would therefore be just a thick safety net that can protect the community, but it might also hold back those who are truly integrated for too long. A fair model would need to combine time with transparent criteria, the possibility of appeal, and an assessment of genuine participation.

The problem of the majority also remains. The ability to vote is not enough if inviolable individual rights, fair procedures, and minority protection are lacking. Therefore, I don't want to reduce the model to referenda. Direct democracy is a corrective mechanism, but it only functions safely as part of a broader legal and cultural framework.

The most difficult cost may be responsibility itself. It's easier to say that the state, an employer, or a politician should take care of the future. In a system that gives citizens greater influence, it's harder to pretend that decisions were made by a complete stranger. Freedom without responsibility leads to chaos, but responsibility without freedom becomes violence. Both sides are needed.

A State Is Judged by Its Ability to Self-Correct

I'm not claiming that Switzerland is a perfect country, nor that every solution it offers should be transferred to Poland. Nor am I claiming that my experience in government and economics replaces comparative institutional research. For me, they are the place where theory becomes tangible.

The most important difference isn't the tax, the form, or even the referendum. It's about the construction of accountability. A good system should allow people to make decisions as closely as possible to their consequences, compare different solutions, peacefully reverse their mistakes, and bear the consequences of their own choices. It must simultaneously protect the individual from the majority, the community from individual irresponsibility, and the whole from the accumulation of power in a single center.

Switzerland is a valuable model for me not because it has solved all problems. It is because it institutionally allows for diversity, competition, and correction. Poland has its own local government and its own democratic mechanisms, but citizens have significantly weaker tools for directly stopping and initiating change at the statewide level.

The question, then, isn't "how to copy Switzerland?" It's: "How can we build a system that trusts citizens enough to give them real responsibility, while also being able to cope with their mistakes?"

Bibliography

✦Building systems for greater autonomy.